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Abstract— Recent works have shown that neural networks
are vulnerable to carefully crafted adversarial examples (AE).
By adding small perturbations to input images, AEs are able
to make the victim model predicts incorrect outputs. Several
research work in adversarial machine learning started to focus
on the detection of AEs in autonomous driving. However, the
existing studies either use preliminary assumption on outputs
of detections or ignore the tracking system in the perception
pipeline. In this paper, we firstly propose a novel distance metric
for practical autonomous driving object detection outputs.
Then, we bridge the gap between the current AE detection
research and the real-world autonomous systems by providing
a temporal detection algorithm, which takes the impact of
tracking system into consideration. We performe evaluation
on Berkeley Deep Drive (BDD) and CityScapes datasets to
show how our approach outperforms existing single-frame-
mAP based AE detections by increasing 17.76% accuracy of
performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Significant progress in Machine Learning (ML) techniques
like Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) recently has enabled the
development of safety-critical ML systems like autonomous
vehicles. Neural network based object detection models are
widely implemented as an import part of the autonomous
driving perception system. Recent results show that au-
tonomous vehicles have become very efficient in practice
and already driven millions of miles without any human
interventions. Twenty US states including California, Texas,
and New York have recently passed legislation to enable
testing and deployment of autonomous vehicles. Since the
control successors are highly depended on the outputs from
the object detector and neural networks [1][2][3], the per-
formance of object detection is significant to the security of
autonomous driving. However, neural network based object
detectors are shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples
by recent researches, inputs that are carefully crafted to fool
the model [4][5][6][7]. Even worse, these perturbed images,
if carefully crafted, can stay adversary when taken as input
from the physical world using a camera. With development of
neural networks, AEs are still threating the robustness[8]. In
order to solve this problem, many researches are focusing on
improving the robustness of neural networks in order to to-
tally defend the adversarial attacks. Unfortunately, until now,
attacking technology is more advanced to that of defending.
Attacking methods are able to fool the system with high
success rate. In this situation, some researches turn to focus
on inventing adversarial examples detection methods, which
rise alarms when adversarial attacks are detected during the
runtime. One the successful detecting method is perturbation
detection. Perturbation based detecting methods hypothesis
that the generated adversarial images, different to benign
samples, are unstable to perturbations. Adding perturbation
to adversarial examples makes a neural network model
predicts very different results, while adding perturbation to
benign images will not make obvious changes. Therefore,
for an input image, people add perturbation to the image,
then do inferences for both original and perturbed images. If
the outputs are different, the input image is regarded as an
adversarial example.
Although the aforementioned AE detection method shows
promising results on image classification, few works im-
plement it to object detection, which is a more realistic
scenario in real world. One significant challenge behind this
is choosing the similarity distance metric for outputs of
object detectors. Unlike classification problems, of which
the output is a 1-D vector that represents the probabilities
for each class, the output of object detection is an ensemble
structure that contains bounding box location, label index and
confidence scores. In order to deal with the difference, the
existing works only have simple approaches. Some existed
works simply assume there is only one bounding box in the
image and fall the problem back to classification problem.
In real world, one image often contains multiple objects.
Thus, we cannot make the aforementioned assumption in
autonomous driving scenario. The other works directly apply
mean average precision (mAP) to calculate the distance
between the outputs of two images. However, average preci-
sion (AP) based metric is designed for calculating similarity
distance of multiple images. By using AP, all the bounding
boxes are treated as equally weighted. It has to be noticed
that for perturbation based AE detection method, even adding
perturbation to benign images will causes output differences.
The majority difference is the changes of small objects.
Due to the reasons discussed above, AP based metric is not
suitable for perturbation based AE detection.
In this paper, our goal is to bridge the gap between the
current adversarial examples (AE) research and the real-
world autonomous systems by providing a unified frame-
work, which allows the AE detection techniques that have
been developed for image classification tasks to be easily
transferred to the visual perception tasks of autonomous
vehicles. To achieve this goal, we first reevaluate the impact
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of AE in the presence of the end-to-end visual percep-
tual systems, and then propose a defense leveraging the
evaluation results to effectively prevent the threat from
AE in self-driving tasks. Code is publicly available at:
https://github.com/erbloo/wAP feature squeezing. We make
the following contributions:
• We empirically validate the threat model of adver-
sarial examples in the self-driving context, and our
results show that the object tracking mechanisms in
the perception pipeline of autonomous vehicles raise
the bar for attack, but are still vulnerable to carefully
crafted adversarial examples that reliably deceive object
detectors.
• We propose a framework for defending autonomous
vehicles from the threat of adversarial examples, which
extends existing detection mechanisms developed for
image classifiers into the object detection domain by (1)
designing novel similarity metric to detect inconsistency
between dense object detection results of two video
frames, and (2) adding temporary information into the
detection pipeline to further improve accuracy.
• To evaluate our approach, we implements adversarial
attacks against state-of-the-art object detectors based on
the most effective attacks in the image classification
domain. We conduct a large scale evaluation on di-
verse adversarial targets on different datasets, including
Cityscapes [9] and real-world autonomous driving video
datasets [10]. The results shows unprecedentedly high
accuracy with x% FP and x% FN.
II. OVERVIEW
A. Background on Object Detection
Deep convolutional neural networks have been applied to
object detection successfully[11][12][13]. Currently, one of
the most popular object detection pipeline [14] [15] uses
two stages processing: the first stage generates a number of
proposals of different scales and positions, and the second
stage classifies the proposals into foreground classes and
performing post-processing such as non-maximal suppres-
sion (NMS). On the other hand, one stage based method
[16] [17] [18] recently made remarkable improvements. One
stage detection methods generate dense proposal bounding
boxes from intermediate feature maps of backbones. Mean-
while, for each bounding box, regression and classification
are performed simultaneously to obtain the final outputs.
B. Adversarial Examples
Carlini and Wagner (C&W) attack proposed different gra-
dient based attacks using different Lp norms, namely CW2,
CW∞, CW0 attacks. It has been recognized as the most
effective attacks against DNNs, and in Madry et al. [19], it
has been shown that a C&W attack is a universal adversary
among all first-order attack methods. Their analysis and
evidence from experiments all suggest any adversarial attack
method that only incorporates gradients of the loss function
w.r.t. the input cannot do significantly better than it.
Existing Defense. Defense mechanisms aims at preventing
AE by hardening the DNN models, and are summarized
by Papernot et al. [20] into two broad categories: ad-
versarial training and gradient masking. Goodfellow et al.
first introduced the idea of adversarial training [21], which
try to integrate existing adversarial existing AE generation
methods into the training process so that the trained model
can easily defend such attacks [19], [22]. Recent work have
also extended the idea of adversarial training to obtain
certified robustness against certain attacks by introducing
either abstract interpretation or perturbations into the training
process [23], [24], [25], [26]. However, it requires prior
knowledge of possible attacks and the robustness of ad-
versarially trained model usually overfits to the choice of
norms [27].
The idea of gradient masking is to enhance the training
process by training the model with small gradients so that
the model will not be sensitive to small changes in the
input [28]. However, it was reported such models can be
broken by advanced attacks. Papernot et al. [20] concluded
that controlling gradient information in training has limited
effects in defending adversarial attacks.
Existing Detection. Compared with those defense mech-
anisms, adversarial example detection choose to prevent the
model from making predictions based on suspicious input
instead of hardening the model itself. The existing state-of-
the-art AE detection works can be classified into two major
categories.
1) Metric based detection: Researchers have proposed to
perform statistical measurement of the inputs (and activa-
tion values) to detect adversarial samples[29][30][31][32].
Feinman et al. [33] proposed to use the Kernel Density
estimation (KD) and Bayesian Uncertainty (BU) to identify
adversarial subspace to separate benign inputs and adversar-
ial samples. Carlini and Wagner [34] showed this method can
be bypassed but also commented this method to be one of
the promising directions. Inspired by ideas from the anomaly
detection community, Ma et al. [35] recently proposed to use
a measurement called Local Intrinsic Dimensionality (LID).
For a given sample input, this method estimates a LID value
which assesses its space-filling capability of the region sur-
rounding the sample by calculating the distance distribution
of the sample and a number of neighbors for individual
layers. The authors empirically show that adversarial samples
tend to have large LID values. Their results demonstrate that
LID outperforms BU and KD in AE detection and currently
represents the state-of-the-art for this kind of detectors.
However, a key challenge of these techniques is how to define
a high-quality statistical metric which can clearly tell the
difference between clean samples and adversarial samples.
Lu et al. [36] have shown that LID is sensitive to the
confidence parameters deployed by an attack and vulnerable
to transferred adversarial samples.
2) Prediction inconsistency based detection: Many other
works are based on the prediction inconsistency [37], [38],
[39]. These works are built based a empirically validated
hypothesis that the robustness of DNNs to local changes
(a) Benign. (b) Benign Squeeze. (c) Adversarial Example. (d) AE Squeeze.
Fig. 1: Sample of feature squeezing for benign and adversarial samples.
(e.g., squeezing, scale, position) does not generalize to the
perturbations added by adversarial examples. Thus they
propose different transformation methods T (·) either on
input samples expecting the transformed sample will produce
different prediction results as the original sample if it is
adversary [37], [39], [40], [41], [42], or on the model
expecting that the transferred model will make predictions
different than the original model if the input sample is
adversarially perturbed [43]. For example, transformation on
inputs using foveation [41], smoothing [37], scaling [42], de-
noising [40], and transformation on model by strengthening
interpretability [43] have all been proposed. Our framework
allows all of these auxiliary transformations that have been
demonstrated effective in unveiling adversarial examples in
image classification and face recognition to be easily trans-
ferred to the object detection domain where new challenges
present (§IV) without sacrificing effectiveness.
C. Notions
• Testing image input x, model predicts f(x).
• Adversary example x′ = x+ ε, ε is the perturbation.
Detecting adversarial examples:
• Define a distance D(x, y) = ||x− y||R
• Find a transformation T (·)
Fig. 2: Illustrated work flow of Kalman filter.
• For normal testing image D(f(x), f(T (x))) < µ
• For adversarial image D(f(x′), f(T (x′)) µ
III. RE-ESTIMATION OF ADVERSARIAL THREAT
Autonomous systems employ object tracking algorithms
to post-process the object detection results to mitigate the
variance and uncertainty of the sensor estimate, before using
them to produce control decisions. Taking an initial set of
object detections (set of bounding boxes and labels), an
object tracking algorithm creates a unique ID for each of
the initial detections and tracks each of the objects as they
move around frames in a video.
An ideal object tracking algorithm is able to handle
when the tracked object ”disappears” or moves outside the
boundaries of the video frame, and is able to pick up objects
it has ”lost” in between frames. Also it is robust to occlusion.
Kalman filter [44], also known as linear quadratic estimation
(LQE), is the most commonly used object tracking algorithm,
and is employed by in the popular open source self-driving
platforms including Apollo [45] and Autoware [46]. Shown
in Figure 2, a Kalman filter first produces estimates of
the current state variables, along with their uncertainties,
and once the outcome of the next measurement (necessarily
corrupted with some amount of error, including random
noise) is observed, these estimates are updated using a
weighted average, with more weight being given to estimates
with higher certainty. The algorithm is recursive. It can run
in real time, using only the present input measurements and
the previously calculated state and its uncertainty matrix; no
additional past information is required. Since Kalman filter
is designed and has been proven effective in tolerating for
missing frames and occasional inaccurate object detection
results [47], it’s nature to review the hypothesis that adver-
sarial examples that are not strong enough to reliably deceive
object detectors have only limited effects on the perception
results.
Recent works [6] study adversarial machine learning at-
tacks considering the practical and complete visual per-
ception pipeline in autonomous driving. Both object detec-
tion and object tracking are taken into consideration. The
study shows that because of the existence of Kalman filter
based tracking system, only temporal adversarial attacks
that successfully attack several frames are able to fool the
whole perception pipeline in autonomous driving. However,
current physical adversary attacking technologies are not
robust enough to generate high success rate AEs in consec-
utive frames. Thus, by aforementioned research, we assume
physical adversary examples that are not robust enough to
consistently fool object detectors have only limited effects
on perception results due to Kalman filter on autonomous
vehicles.
The threat reestimation results suggest that though Kalman
filter raises the bar for adversarial attack, strong and robust
adversarial examples can still fool the detector and cause
wrong perception results.
IV. DESIGN
A. Overview
Figure 3 shows an overview of our AE detection frame-
work. First, for each frame xt coming from the camera at
time t, the system obtains a transformed input x′t using an
auxiliary transformation T (x). It is based on a hypothesis
that the robustness of DNNs to local changes (e.g., squeez-
ing, scale, position) does not generalize to the perturbations
added by adversarial examples, which have been validated
by previous AE detection works [41], [37], [40]. Thus if x
is an adversarial example, it is highly likely that the object
detection result f(x) is very different from f(x′).
However, there is no available metric to describe and
quantify the similarity of two object detection results. Pre-
vious adversarial detections on image classification tasks
simply need to compare the predicted classes and their
confidences for differences, while in object detection, we
need to deal with dense and sometimes overlapped bounding
boxes, and it’s non-trivial to design a metric that balances
precision and recall well. Mean average precision (mAP) is
the most commonly used metric to evaluate the performance
of an object detector, but we will show later that the false
positives can be prohibitively high if using mAP as the
distance metric, since it assigns all equal weights to detected
objects regardless of their sizes and classes. Also calculating
mAP between two frames instead of a set of testing images
provides no statistical significance.
Thus we design a novel distance metric D(x, y) to pre-
cisely describe the differences between two object detection
results (detailed in §IV-B).
At last by monitoring the variance of a temporal inconsis-
tency metric T (Dt), adversarial examples can be detected in
real time, and mitigation actions, such as requiring human
control, or rolling back to the predictions by Kalman filter
could be taken in time.
B. Frame-based Distance Metric D(x, y)
Algorithm 1: Frame-based Distance Metric D(x, y)
Data: ground truth: {bounding boxes, confidence score,
object class}, prediction: {bounding boxes,
confidence score, object class}
Result: Detection distance
tp = [] ;
fn = [] ;
for i← 0 to Ngt do
for j ← 0 to Npd do
IoUij ← getIoU(gti.bbox, pdj .bbox);
if IoUij > MINOV ERLAP &&
gti.cl == pdj .cl then
tp append (i, j) ;
end
end
fn append i ;
end
fp = {0, 1, ..., Npd} ;
for i← 0 to Ntp do
del fp[tp[i,1]] ;
end
Dtp = F(
∑
(i,j)∈tpDA(gti.bbox,pdj .bbox)
Apd+Agt
)+γcs
∑
(i,j)∈tp |
Cgti − Cpdj | ;
Dfp = F(
∑
i∈fp Apdi
Apd
) + γcs
∑
i∈fp Cpdi ;
Dfn = F(
∑
i∈fn Agti
Agt
) + γcs
∑
i∈gt Cgti ;
D(x, y) =
αtpDtp+αfpDfp+αfnDfn
αtp+αfp+αfn
We propose a frame-based distance metric given detection
results of two images x and y. From output of image
Object
Detection
Model
AE Detected ! 
Auxiliary
Transformation
Distance
Metric
Temporal
Inconsistency
Metric
Fig. 3: Proposed framework for detecting adversarial examples that can reliably deceive object detectors. The model is
evaluated on both the original frames and the pre-processed frames after a chosen auxiliary transformation T (·). A distance
D· is calculated on the object detection results of each pair of frames. The distances on consecutive frames used to further
obtain a temporal inconsistency metric I(·), and the adversarial attack can be detected on the fly by monitoring the variance
of I over time.
detectorI = {I0, I1, ..., IN}, I ∈ {x, y}, bounding boxes
positions(bbox), bounding boxes confident scores(cs) and
bounding boxes predicted classes(cl) are provided for each
input image. We refer detection result of image x as ground
truth and detection result of image y as prediction. Let
tp be the set of pairs of true positive bounding boxes
indexes, fp be the set of indexes of false positive prediction
bounding boxes and fn be the set of indexes of false
negative ground truth bounding boxes. Based on Intersection
over Union(IoU) values of ground truth bounding boxes,
prediction bounding boxes and given minimal overlapping
threshold(MINOV ERLAP ), we classify bounding boxes into
true positive set, false positive set and false negative set.
Distance is composed of two parts: area based distance
and confidence score based distance. For bounding boxes
pairs in true positive set, difference area(DA(A,B) = (A−
B) ∪ (B − A)) is calculated and divided by sum of areas
of both ground truth and prediction bounding boxes. For
false positive/false negative set, bounding boxes areas are
calculated and divided by sum of areas of prediction/ground
truth bounding boxes areas. All the area based values are
fed into weighed function F(x) = xx+a to make small
bounding boxes contribute less. For confident scores part, we
obtain difference of confident scores of true positive samples,
confident scores of false positive samples and false negative
samples. All the confident score based values are multiplied
by a constant weight parameter(γcs). Dtp, Dfp and Dfn are
weighted summed to get the final distanceD(x, y).
C. Temporal Consistency
In perception system, a tracker will be deleted if no
objects is associated with for a duration of R frames, or
called a reserved age (R). It prevents the tracks from being
accidentally deleted due to infrequent false negatives of
object detectors. [6] Thus, for detection algorithm for AE,
only attacks that last longer than reserved age should be
regarded as a valid adversarial example. Inspired by this fact,
we propose a temporal detection algorithm T (Dt), which can
be explained as
y = T (D0...Dt) =
t∏
i=0
(sgn(Di − θ)) (1)
Where sgn is signum function and θ is the threshold for
distance metric D(·).
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Experimental Setup
Original testing data set comes from BDD10k [48] and
Cityscapes [9] datasets. We implement both white-box and
black-box attacks and insert adversarial frames into the
videos to build our adversarial evaluation set. For white-
box attack, we implement CWinf attack that is the state
of the art white-box attacking methodology. For black-box
attack, we implement Gaussian Noise and Brightness attacks.
We choose best performance feature squeezing methods: bit-
wise squeeze. For generating object detection outputs, we use
Yolo-v3 [16], which is widely implemented in autonomous
driving perception system.
B. Evaluation on Single Frame Adversarial Example Detec-
tion
Single frame adversarial examples results are shown in
Figure 4 and Table I.
Figure 4 shows ROC curves for mAP and proposed wAP
methods. C&W, Gaussian Noise and Brightness attacks are
performed and Bit4, Bit5, Bit6 and Bit7 are implemented as
squeezing methods.
Table I presents the detailed accuracy results of sin-
gle frame experiments using testing set of BDD10k and
CityScapes. In the table, C&W, Gaussian Noise and Bright-
ness attacks are implemented and Bit(3, 4, 5, 6, 7) squeezes
are used as AE detection algorithm. We can see that our
proposed method outperformed the mAP based algorithm
on both Bdd10k and CityScapes datasets. For 27 over 30
experiments using black-box and white-box attacks, our
proposed method shows higher detection accuracies. Bit7
shows better results comparing to other bits squeezes. For
instance, the proposed method reports 83.77% and 83.88%
(a) C&W Bit4 ROC. (b) C&W Bit5 ROC. (c) C&W Bit6 ROC. (d) C&W Bit7 ROC.
(e) Gaussian Noise Bit4 ROC. (f) Gaussian Noise Bit5 ROC. (g) Gaussian Noise Bit6 ROC. (h) Gaussian Noise Bit7 ROC.
(i) Brightness Bit4 ROC. (j) Brightness Bit5 ROC. (k) Brightness Bit6 ROC. (l) Brightness Bit7 ROC.
Fig. 4: Results of FP-FN and ROC curves for mAP and the proposed wAP metric.
accuracy on C&W-Bit7 experiment, respectively. The accu-
racies are 3.71% and 3.77% more that that of mAP metric.
Figure 5 shows the statistical results. The average accuracy
of two datasets are shown in the figure. We can see that the
proposed wAP algorithm outperforms mAP baselines in all
experiments.
C. Evaluation on Temporal Adversarial Example Detection
As discussed in [6], the state of the art temporal attack is
able to successfully attack tracking system in 3 frames. Thus,
we set temporal frames i = 3. Figure II shows the accuracy
results that compare the performance between single frame
and temporal experiments. Bit7 is used as squeezing method,
since it shows the best performance in Table I. We can see
that both temporal based AE detection results from mAP
and wAP have better results than single frame based results.
This shows that the algorithm IV-C improves the detection
performance. It should be noticed that the proposed temporal
wAP algorithm achieves the best accuracy result for all the
attacking methods.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Applicability to other Perception Tasks
As discussed in [37], the feature-squeezing approach could
be used in many domains where deep learning is used.
Additionally, the proposed wAP metric is calculated based
on IoU. Thus, any overlapping based perception tasks such
as object detection, semantic segmentation and text detection
& recognition are fitful to the proposed detecting algorithm.
As for proposed temporal algorithm, whatever temporal and
tracking systems that based tasks such as video and audio
processing can be applied.
B. Adaptive Attack
Comparing to mAP baseline distance metric, our proposed
wAP metric is the optimized version, which focuses on single
image instead of the whole dataset and introduces weights
to bounding boxes. Thus, for different sorts of attacks, even
any of them that is able to effectively attacking the detecting
pipeline, the proposed metric may still perform better than
mAP.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a weighted-AP (wAP) dis-
tance metric and temporal optimization method to improve
the detecting of adversarial example for object detection
in autonomous driving perception system. Specifically, our
proposed metric focuses on single image bounding boxes
and is applied on sequential frames to fit tracking system.
Compared to existing single frame mAP detecting method,
the results on BDD and CityScapes show that our proposed
method performs better on detecting adversarial examples
for autonomous driving perception system. One intuition
behind the temporal wAP is that fooling single frame is
not enough to successfully attack the perception system.
This is because tracking system is able to make predictions
Accuracy(%) Bdd10k Cityscapes
Attack mtd. Squeeze mtd. mAP Proposed mAP Proposed
C&W bit3 56.20 59.24 56.02 59.31
bit4 67.23 73.46 67.03 73.55
bit5 75.41 75.68 74.72 80.20
bit6 79.49 83.41 79.37 83.50
bit7 80.06 83.77 80.11 83.88
Gaussian Noise bit3 50.34 50.85 50.45 50.67
bit4 51.14 59.47 50.22 50.87
bit5 58.68 64.26 52.64 52.64
bit6 64.79 67.17 57.93 58.04
bit7 66.36 67.47 63.10 63.54
Brightness bit3 50.21 50.75 50.23 50.00
bit4 51.78 59.48 50.00 50.34
bit5 58.84 63.03 53.27 53.27
bit6 64.51 65.93 57.55 59.12
bit7 66.25 66.69 60.38 61.51
TABLE I: Results of detection accuracies using C&W, Gaussian Noise and Brightness attacks to different feature squeezing
methods.
Fig. 5: Overall results comparison for proposed method and mAP. The accuracies are calculated by averaging the results of
Bdd10k and Cityscapes.
Detection C&W GaussianNoise Brightness
Single Frame mAP 67.61 62.85 60.14wAP (Proposed) 72.05 69.50 68.12
Temporal mAP 80.82 73.22 71.11wAP (Proposed) 85.37 74.61 73.79
TABLE II: Results comparison for proposed method and
mAP using both single frame and temporal detection sce-
narios.
when bounding boxes of objects miss for a small num-
ber of frames. Moreover, practical object detection outputs
contain dense bounding boxes that cannot easily obtain a
scalar distance between two output results and mAP is a
metric widely used for dataset based evaluation but not
for calculating distance for two single images. Evaluation
on different autonomous driving datasets show that this
proposed pipeline greatly enhance detecting performance
by a large margin compared to the baseline method. We
hope that our proposed distance metric and temporal so-
lution can make research that are related to detecting of
object detection more realistic. Code is publicly available
at: https://github.com/erbloo/wAP feature squeezing.
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